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While it is common knowledge that not all agricultural lands have the same productive capacity,
it is increasingly recognized that the environmental impacts of agricultural production also differ.
For example, some fields can provide much greater reductions in soil erosion than others.
Similarly, some lands provide critical habitat for endangered species while other lands provide
habitat for more common wildlife species. Likewise, the field that is best able to provide soil ero-
sion reductions may provide little in the way of wildlife habitat, while some fields may provide
medium levels of both attributes.
Conservation programs aim to enhance the environment across a range of attributes, such as
reducing soil erosion, improving wildlife habitat, and preserving fragile ecosystems. To best
achieve conservation goals, programs can target those farms and fields where conservation
efforts are likely to generate the most profound or widespread environmental benefits for a
given program size. Targeting mechanisms that are now in place have improved the perform-
ance of conservation programs, but more could be done. The availability of detailed, field-level
information on both the cost and benefits of conservation efforts is key to realizing those
potential gains. Investing in information infrastructure is one way to increase gains and reduce
costs of enhanced targeting in conservation programs.Better Targeting, Better Outcomes
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Targeting Is a Means of Choosing Which Offers To Accept
Whenever more farmers offer to participate in an agricultural conservation program than program size
allows, a means of selecting participants is needed. Selection strategies that have been used include first-
come first-served, cost minimization, and targeting. Targeting uses information on costs, operators, and
resource characteristics to choose those that best meet program goals. Targeting mechanisms can be
designed to achieve many types of program goals, such as maximizing reductions in soil erosion per acre,
minimizing program costs while attaining a set of minimum standards, or maximizing improvements in
environmental quality relative to costs.
Eligibility criteria, participant incentive schemes, and ranking mechanisms are all forms of targeting based
on operator and resource characteristics.
 A program manager can target by setting eligibility criteria. These are standards that fields,
farms, or households must meet in order to qualify as a program participant. Examples
include prior cropping history, the current use of conservation practices, and location with-
in a sensitive ecosystem or watershed.
 Incentives are used to selectively encourage farmers to enroll in conservation programs. These
incentives base program payment levels on the farm-level cost of implementing the prac-
tice—including the opportunity costs associated with constraints on land use. (For a further
discussion of setting conservation program incentives, see Economic Brief No. 3.)
 Ranking mechanisms prioritize applicants by assigning scores to each application. Applications
with higher scores are more likely to be accepted. Scores can be based on multiple environ-
mental criteria, such as expected reduction in soil erosion, improvement in wildlife habitat,
and improvement in water quality. Scores can also incorporate costs—with higher costs
decreasing scores. By including both benefits and costs, a ranking mechanism could give
fields with more benefits and higher costs the same score as fields with fewer benefits but
lower costs.
Targeting Helps Programs Achieve Multiple Objectives
Four of USDA’s principal conservation programs address a variety of environmental objectives, and use
different types of targeting to do so (table 1). (All have more farmers willing to participate than the budg-
et and acreage limits allow.)  
To illustrate how targeting is implemented, we highlight a few features of the two largest conservation
payment programs: the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the Environmental Quality Incentives
Program (EQIP). Since 2002, the CRP has accepted about two-thirds of the acres offered, while the pro-
portion of applications funded by EQIP ranges between 15 and 30 percent per year.
Targeting based on eligibility criteria 
 The CRP generally requires fields to have been in crop production for 4 of the 6 years prior
to 2002. This ensures that land moves out of crop production and into permanent cover.
 Cropland having characteristics that are deemed to be of particularly high environmental
value can be enrolled in the CRP without meeting other criteria or competing in the CRP’s
selection process. For example, the CRP’s preferential treatment of permanent cover on
land within 600 feet of a stream stops erosion that is likely to reach the stream, filters sedi-
ment from waters moving toward the stream, and provides excellent wildlife habitat.
Targeting based on incentive schemes
 The CRP payment formula allows higher payments for higher quality acreage.
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Targeting based on ranking mechanisms 
 When initiated in 1985, the CRP targeted highly erodible land. The 1990 farm bill broadened
the program’s environmental objectives. In response, program managers developed the
Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) to rank applicants. The EBI has six factors, five of
which deal with environmental and resource concerns. Scores are based on the estimated size
of expected resource quality change, and the importance of these changes to the public.
--------- Wildlife benefit scores are greater when the farmer plants wildlife-friendly native grasses
instead of non-native grasses.
--------- The soil erosion score is higher on fields where potential erodibility is higher.
The EBI also includes CRP contract costs, which include annual rental payments and cost-
share payments. Farmers who propose contracts with lower per acre costs are awarded more
points.
Table 1—USDA Conservation Programs and Targeting









Only highly erodible lands, or lands in regions with special conservation needs
(Conservation Priority Areas), can be accepted.
All offers are awarded points based on several different environmental factors. Offers
that receive more points (summed across all factors) receive higher ranks.
Less expensive acres receive more points in the ranking index.










All farmers can apply, though 60% of all funding is dedicated to livestock producers.
Allocation of money to States is based on an aggregate ranking index. The index
considers a wide variety of State-level resource measures and measures of agricultur-
al activity. States allocate funds using their own ranking mechanism.
Cost can be considered as a factor, with certain restrictions imposed administratively
and by Congress. In particular, “bidding down” (requesting a lower cost share for a
practice) cannot be used as a deciding factor. 









Land that can be restored to wetlands and can provide wildlife benefits.
Allocation of money to States is based on an aggregate ranking index using four fac-
tors: ecological concerns (such as the rate of wetland loss), landowner interest, State-
level program delivery performance, and cost.
Cost is the least important of the four factors.










Farms with prime soils, or with historical/archaeological significance.
Allocation of money to States, based on an aggregate ranking index. Factors include
agricultural trends (such as the rate of farmland loss), and measures of State-level pro-
gram performance.
Cost is used as a minor factor in the allocation to States. 
State programs can use their own ranking mechanisms when choosing which farms
to enroll. Note that FRPP is a cost-share program, so farms in States (or other local
entities) that are not interested in cost sharing will never receive FRPP offers. 
*The targeting impacts are those for competitive signups. Some lands deemed to have particularly important environ-
mental attributes (for example, cropland within 600 feet of a stream) need not meet other eligibility criteria.ECONOMIC BRIEF Better Targeting, Better Outcomes
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 A national formula is used to allocate EQIP funds to States. Rankings are based on the
acreage of land in different kinds of agricultural production, the extent of livestock produc-
tion, measures of land quality, and measures of environmental conditions.
--------- EQIP allows each State to develop its own allocation mechanism to distribute funds to
local units (such as counties and conservation districts). Each unit then develops a
ranking mechanism based on local resource concerns. For example, some units give
more credit for water quality improvements and others give more credit for erosion
reductions. States can consider costs in their EQIP targeting schemes.
Both the CRP and EQIP approaches give farmers flexibility to decide their most cost-effective strategy
for obtaining CRP and EQIP contracts. For example, when offering CRP contracts, farmers choose the
field they offer, cover type, program payment rate, and other factors that affect the offer’s EBI. When
offering an EQIP contract, farmers choose the conservation practices they will implement (and thus the
environmental impacts that they will address) and other factors that determine the likelihood of obtain-
ing EQIP funding.
Targeting Relies on Data, Models, and Opinions 
Ranking mechanisms can account for the size of the physical change in environmental quality and the
public’s value of the change—and account for these differences on a very localized (i.e., field-by-field)
basis. Although precise measures of these changes are often unavailable, ranking mechanisms have been
able to account for some variations in the overall benefit of conservation practices by taking advantage
of the opinions of experts (e.g., biologists, agronomists, and program managers) and biophysical and
economic models and data. Examples of these include:
 Opinions of local personnel. The EQIP ranking mechanism attempts to address localized pro-
gram impacts by allowing States to make the enrollment decisions—assuming that State
program mangers can better identify those fields or regions where environmental benefits
tend to be greater.
 Economic models. The CRP ranking mechanism attempts to address some local concerns by
incorporating estimates of impacts on the affected population. For example, the water-
quality benefit score gives preferential rankings to fields where more people are likely to be
affected by changes in groundwater quality.
 Biophysical models. The CRP uses two models to calculate field-level estimates of erosion—the
Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation for estimates of sheet and rill erosion and the Wind
Erosion Equation for estimates of wind erosion.
Targeting for Environmental Benefits May Involve Geography
The benefits from accepting a farm into a program will depend on the environmental and physical fea-
tures of an offer, and may be heavily influenced by land and resource attributes prevalent in and around
the offer’s location. However, these kinds of detailed data are not available for a variety of environmen-
tal impacts, even though benefits may be very large.
As an alternative, targeting schemes can define the geographic regions where benefits are likely to be high and
use those regions as proxies for more specific information. However, targeting to geographic regions with-
out considering environmental criteria can reduce cost-effectiveness in achieving environmental goals.
Although geographic regions are not a dominant factor in shaping the distribution of conservation expendi-
tures, they are a part of current targeting schemes:
 The CRP uses Conservation Priority Areas (CPA) as one means of determining eligibility.
CPAs are ecological regions and do not follow county or State boundaries. In essence,
retired agricultural lands in these areas are assumed to provide an array of regionally impor-
tant ecological benefits. For example, sediment and nutrients from the Chesapeake Bay
watershed are known to affect the health of fisheries and quality of recreation throughout
the Chesapeake Bay. To account for these benefits, the watershed is designated a CPA.
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 EQIP allocates funds across States rather than ecological regions,
but the allocation scheme is designed to direct funds to States
where the program’s environmental goals are most likely to be met.
Targeting Can Increase Benefits 
and Reduce Costs
Conservation programs have generally had positive environmental out-
comes. For example, ERS estimates that, without the CRP, erosion would be
240 million tons per year (12 percent) higher than the current level of agri-
cultural erosion. Although complete information on the gains from target-
ing is not available, recent research illustrates the contribution of targeting:
 For programs that establish permanent cover, targeting land
around wetlands can benefit wildlife. Studies have shown that duck
nesting success can double when land surrounding wetlands is
placed in permanent cover.
 An ERS study estimated that targeting based on the EBI (rather
than on soil erosion alone) may have increased CRP benefits asso-
ciated with freshwater recreation, wildlife viewing, and pheasant
hunting from $459 million to $828 million per year (fig. 1).
 An ERS study that simulated targeting scenarios found that, by tar-
geting to increase the multiple benefits of soil conservation (values
of improvement in the recreational quality of water, reduced flood
damages, savings in municipal filtration costs, etc.) relative to costs,
benefits could be 20 to 50 percent higher than when targeting only
to reduce erosion relative to costs (fig. 2).
Although targeting can affect which fields are enrolled in a program, tar-
geting need not affect the regional distribution of program acres, as evi-
denced by the intraregional shifts in CRP land following adoption of the
EBI (fig. 3). Instead targeting can allow a program to enroll the lands
within a region that are more likely to meet environmental goals.
Targeting Has Improved Program 
Performance, But Could Do More
Targeting mechanisms have helped conservation programs deliver greater
environmental benefits by choosing program participants based on crite-
ria that reflect program goals. Since 1990, when targeting schemes were
initiated in the CRP and EQIP, program managers have become more
sophisticated in designing targeting schemes that achieve a wide variety of
environmental and social goals.
An increased understanding of ecological/societal impacts of conserva-
tion actions and the availability of data, especially GIS resources,
strengthen USDA’s ability to target. Some possible means of improving
targeting include:
(1)  New index formulations. Current indices, such as the EBI, use
a simple additive equation. More sophisticated formulae might better capture the interactions
of economic and environmental concerns. For example, with accurate data, the use of bene-
fit-cost ratios would provide the greatest benefits per dollar spent.
Water quality benefits (million dollars)
Figure 2
Targeting provides more benefits when addressing 
multiple environmental impacts than when targeting 
erosion alone.
Source: Agri-Environmental Policy at the Crossroads: Guideposts 
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The Environmental Benefits Index substantially increased 
the benefits of the CRP for two of the three types of 
outdoor recreational activities evaluated by ERS.
Source: Economic Valuation of Environmental Benefits and the 
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--------- The CRP targets contracts based on the sum of the benefits and cost scores, rather than
on benefits divided by costs. Adopting a benefit/cost rule could increase net program
benefits. However, because of inaccuracies in the measure of the full value of the CRP’s
benefits, a benefit-cost approach will not be without error.
(2) Accounting for variations in biophysical responses and public preferences across
regions and environmental impacts. This could be accomplished through reliance on the
knowledge of local stakeholders, or through the use of regionally disaggregated studies and sur-
veys of both public preferences and the local biophysical effects of agriculture.
--------- Available studies suggest that water quality benefits from reductions in erosion vary by ten-
fold across the country. However, current targeting mechanisms (such as the EBI) do not
account for regional differences in the impacts of erosion on the quality of surface water.
--------- A targeting mechanism could reflect the number of people who will see subsequent
changes in the diversity and health of wildlife populations. This may mean favoring the
retirement of some lands with moderate wildlife responses but near dense populations
of people.
(3) More accurate biophysical and socioeconomic information. Targeting relies on effective
use of good information. This includes accurate measures of a policy’s impacts on farm pro-
duction practices, the changes in environmental quality that are likely to follow, and the public
value of changes in environmental quality. In addition, information can help farmers better
choose and implement desirable practices. But information is costly and could require more
employee time, funds, and administrative resources per program contract.
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE IS AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY PROVIDER AND EMPLOYER
For more information, see www.ers.usda.gov/abouters/privacy.htm
Figure 3
The EBI changed the intra-regional distribution of CRP acreage.
When first initiated, the CRP was designed to meet a single environmental objective: to 
reduce soil erosion. The 1990 Farm Bill broadened the environmental goals of the CRP. As a 
result, by 2002, newly enrolled acres have replaced approximately 14 percent of the land 
that had been enrolled. Although the distribution of CRP acreage across major regions has 
not changed, the distribution of acres within the regions has changed.
1 Dot = 5000 acres 
removed between 1990 and 2002
1 Dot = 5000 acres added 
between 1990 and 2002
Source: CRP contracts file.
Targeting relies on
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